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Typically, adults give a primary role to the agent’s intention to harm when performing
a moral judgment of accidental harm. By contrast, children often focus on outcomes,
underestimating the actor’s mental states when judging someone for his action, and
rely on what we suppose to be intuitive and emotional processes. The present study
explored the processes involved in the development of the capacity to integrate agents’
intentions into their moral judgment of accidental harm in 5 to 8-year-old children.
This was done by the use of different metacognitive trainings reinforcing different
abilities involved in moral judgments (mentalising abilities, executive abilities, or no
reinforcement), similar to a paradigm previously used in the field of deductive logic.
Children’s moral judgments were gathered before and after the training with non-verbal
cartoons depicting agents whose actions differed only based on their causal role or
their intention to harm. We demonstrated that a metacognitive training could induce
an important shift in children’s moral abilities, showing that only children who were
explicitly instructed to “not focus too much” on the consequences of accidental harm,
preferentially weighted the agents’ intentions in their moral judgments. Our findings
confirm that children between the ages of 5 and 8 are sensitive to the intention of
agents, however, at that age, this ability is insufficient in order to give a “mature” moral
judgment. Our experiment is the first that suggests the critical role of inhibitory resources
in processing accidental harm.
Keywords: moral development, theory of mind capacities, inhibitory control resources, dual-processes,
metacognition
INTRODUCTION
Currently, multiple factors are considered to inﬂuence our moral judgment competencies
(Cushman et al., 2010; Young and Dungan, 2011). These factors include emotional and intuitive
processes (Greene et al., 2001), abstract reasoning abilities (Greene et al., 2004), theory of mind
(ToM) capacities (Young et al., 2007), and executive control resources (Greene et al., 2004;
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 March 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 190
Gvozdic et al. Inhibitory Reinforcement and Intent-Based Moral Judgment
FIGURE 1 | Schematic illustration of Greene’s dual processes model (Greene, 2009) applied to (A) the Footbridge dilemma and (B) accidental harm. In
the Footbridge dilemma, a runaway trolley is headed for five people. You (with the question mark) are standing next to a man on a footbridge spanning the tracks
where the only way to save the five people is to push this man off the footbridge and into the path of the trolley. When participants have to decide whether they
would push the man, they undergo a cognitive conflict. On one side, the system responsible for the evaluation of the action to be performed generates an automatic
emotional aversion that leads the participants to condemn the action. One the other side, the system responsible for the rational evaluation of the action’s
consequences (the action will save more lives than it will cause deaths) leads them to consider this action as permissible. To solve the conflict rationally, people need
to deploy inhibitory control to override their negative intuition arising from the evaluation of the action to be performed. In the case of accidental harm, there is an
individual that caused harm without the intention to do so (e.g., he just wants to swing and strucks another individual because he did not see him arriving). According
to our hypothesis, on one side the system responsible for the evaluation of agent’s causal role generates an automatic emotional aversion toward the person
responsible for the suffering of a victim. On another side, the system responsible for the evaluation of the agent’ intention leads people to evaluate positively the
agent.
Moore et al., 2008; Buon et al., 2013b). Even though their exact
contribution, interaction and/or potential competition in adults’
moral judgments are not well established and vary across diﬀerent
theoretical points of view, most scholars now agree that moral
judgments depend on both intuitive and controlled processes,
and that moral competences rest upon the ability to deal with and
integrate conﬂicting moral and social considerations (Smetana
and Killen, 2008; Young and Dungan, 2011; Buon et al., 2015).
For instance, according to Greene’s (2009) dual process model,
based on the now famous Footbridge dilemma (see Figure 1A),
emotional/intuitive systems tend to dominate people’s judgments
in situations of high conﬂict, unless they are able to deploy
important inhibitory control resources to engage in andmake use
of more rational considerations (for a review, see Cushman et al.,
2010).
This paper aims to explore the validity of a dual process
architecture in order to understand an important landmark in
children’s moral development: the ability to generate intent-based
moral judgments. Typically, adults tend to blame individuals
for their intent to cause harm, even if they did not manage to
fulﬁll their malevolent intent (i.e., in case of attempted harm).
Conversely, we tend to judgemore leniently someone who caused
harm without the intention to do so (i.e., accidental harm; Piaget,
1965/1932; Cushman, 2008). This ability to prioritize information
about individuals’ intentions when producing a moral judgment
is thus a critical feature of adults’ morality; however, it is not
until late in development that children are able to do the
same. As Piaget’s (1965/1932) work demonstrated, children until
the age of 8/9 years tend to focus on the outcomes when
making moral judgments about someone’s act, while ignoring
the protagonist’s intention. For instance he showed that young
children considered that a boy breaking eight cups accidentally
is naughtier compared to a boy who tried to take some jam
while his mother was away and only broke one cup. Later
studies, using more various and child-friendly methodologies,
have reﬁned the initial developmental pattern proposed by Piaget.
In particular, they have reported that under optimized conditions
(e.g., stimuli including an explicit and salient description of the
protagonist’s mental states; showing stimuli by pairs of stories
diﬀering on only one criteria, i.e., intentions or outcomes),
preschoolers between the age of 3 and 5 could be able to
judge someone committing intentional harm as naughtier than
someone committing accidental harm (Nelson, 1980; Baird and
Astington, 2004; Nobes et al., 2009; Cushman et al., 2013, but
see Imamog˘lu, 1975; Zelazo et al., 1996; Helwig et al., 2001).
Yet, Piaget’s main claim has never been completely challenged
since most of those post-Piagetian studies have also reported
an increase in the use of information about intentions and
a decrease in the use of outcomes between the ages of 3–5
and 7–9 (Nelson-Le Gall, 1985; Shultz et al., 1988; Baird and
Astington, 2004; Nobes et al., 2009; Cushman et al., 2013). Put
simply, even though preschoolers show some sensitivity to a
protagonist’s intent when making moral judgments, their ability
to prioritize information about intentions undergoes a protracted
development. Interestingly, in one recent study, the authors
demonstrated that this late emergence mainly regards cases of
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accidental harm and not attempted harm (Cushman et al., 2013).
That is, whereas 5-year-old children are as likely as older children
to blame individuals who commit attempted harm, it is not until
8 years of age that children are able to judge accidental harm
leniently. What could be the cognitive mechanisms underlying
this late moral development?
To date, most studies that have investigated the mechanisms
underlying the ability to generate intent-based moral judgment
have focused on the critical role of ToM, the ability to represent
and infer individuals’ mental states and to use them to explain
and predict others’ behaviors (Premack and Woodruﬀ, 1978).
Especially, adult studies have reported evidence in favor of a
relationship between ToM and moral judgment (Knobe, 2005;
Moran et al., 2011; Buon et al., 2013a), as well as neuroscience
research, which demonstrated an important role of brain regions
responsible for mental states attribution in judgments of blame
ascription (Young et al., 2007, 2010; Young and Saxe, 2009).
From a developmental perspective, several studies have reported
a signiﬁcant relationship between children’s ToM competencies
(assessed by their ability to pass the false belief task1) and
their ability to generate intent-based moral judgment (Baird and
Astington, 2004; Killen et al., 2011; Fu et al., 2014). For instance,
Killen et al. (2011) have demonstrated that children who passed
the false belief task were more likely, than their peers who did not,
to assess the intention of someone accidentally harming someone
else as nice, and to evaluate her action leniently. Even though
this does suggest that ToM is indeed critical for judging cases
of accidental harm, it should be noted that the ability to pass
the FBT has been shown to also involve general purpose skills,
including executive functions resources (Carlson et al., 2004;
Apperly et al., 2006), therefore limiting a clear-cut interpretation
of those ﬁndings.
Another cognitive tool that may be highly useful for
children (and adults) to generate intent-based moral judgment
is inhibitory control- the ability to tune out stimuli that are
irrelevant to the task or process at hand or to the mind’s
current state (Macleod, 2007). In addition to its potential
involvement in ToM reasoning (Carlson et al., 2004; Apperly
et al., 2006), several authors have proposed that processing
accidental harm may be underlined by the same type of cognitive
architecture as the one required to process the Footbridge
dilemma described above (Young et al., 2007; Buon et al., 2013b;
Cushman, 2014, see also Figure 1B). In short, when faced with
accidental harm, individuals ﬁrst have an (negative) intuitive
and emotional reaction toward the protagonist who carried out
this action based on the perception of the harm he caused.
1In the most common version of the FBT, children are shown a story involving two
characters. For example, the child is shown two dolls, Sally and Anne, who have
a basket and a box, respectively. Sally also has a marble, which she places in her
basket, and then leaves the room. While she is out of the room, Anne takes the
marble from the basket and puts it in the box. Sally returns, and the child is then
asked where Sally will look for the marble. The child passes the task if she answers
that Sally will look in the basket, where she put the marble; the child fails the task
if she answers that Sally will look in the box, where the child knows the marble
is hidden, even though Sally cannot know this, since she did not see it hidden
there. To pass the task, the child must be able to understand that another’s mental
representation of the situation is diﬀerent from their own, and the child must be
able to predict behavior based on that understanding.
This negative appraisal of the protagonist would then enter
in conﬂict with a more positive evaluation built through ToM
inferences about the agents’ innocent intent. Finally, in line
with Greene’s proposal, in order for this conﬂict to be solved
in favor of non-emotional and more rational considerations
(i.e., the protagonist’s innocent intentions), individuals need to
override their initial negative intuition with the help of their
inhibitory control. If this proposition was correct, 5 to 7-year-
olds selective diﬃculty to judge accidental harm would be mainly
explained by their inhibitory control limitations. Evidence in
favor of this hypothesis is quite numerous in adults studies.
Indeed, when judging accidental harm, adults have been shown
to be in a situation of cognitive conﬂict (Young et al., 2007)
and recent ﬁndings assert that whereas an adult’s evaluation of
the protagonist’s causal role relies upon intuitive and emotional
mechanisms when faced with accidental harm, the integration
of its neutral intent in their moral judgment would require
costly cognitive mechanisms (Young et al., 2012; Buon et al.,
2013b). Yet, when it comes to the development of the ability to
generate intent-based moral judgments, though the importance
of inhibitory control capacities has been proposed by several
authors (Zelazo et al., 1996; Richardson et al., 2012; Cushman
et al., 2013), no study has yet tested this directly. Nevertheless
indirect evidence may argue in favor of this hypothesis. In
particular, several studies suggest that preschoolers are much
more likely to generate intent-based moral judgments when the
consequences are absent, or at least kept constant in the stimuli
compared by participants (e.g., see Baird and Astington, 2004).
This experimental speciﬁcity may in fact attenuate the conﬂict
that occurs between the information about the protagonist’s
intent and the consequences of his/her actions and therefore
reduce the need to deploy inhibitory skills, making the task easier
for children.
Investigating the critical role of inhibitory control in making
mature intent based moral judgments is not only in line with
recent modeling of adults’ moral competencies (Greene, 2009),
but also goes well with recent models of children’s social and
cognitive development. First, it ﬁts the process-based account
recently advanced by the social domain theory (Richardson et al.,
2012), according to which two competing systems could be at
work when making socio-moral decisions: an unreﬂective system
that tends to focus on the outcomes of a harmful action, and
a (reﬂective) system that tends to focus on the protagonist’s
intention. Accordingly, when faced with accidental action, young
children have diﬃculties to override the experience system,
which likely encourages a focus on the outcomes (e.g., if the
outcome is bad then the intentions and actions are bad) whereas
older children would be more and more able to override the
experiential system by the representational one, with the help
of their executive development. Secondly, and more broadly,
the idea that inhibition may play a key role in the emergence
of intent-based moral judgment allows to extend some of the
recent neo-Piagetian views of cognitive development to moral
competences (Houdé and Borst, 2015). According to such a view,
inhibitory control is essential to override the automatic/heuristic
responses that adults and children rely on heavily and activate
more costly algorithms (i.e., slow, analytical, and cognitively
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costly strategies that always provide the correct solution). To date,
using speciﬁc methodologies (see for a review, Houdé and Borst,
2014), several studies have supported the role of inhibition in
the development of logical and reasoning abilities. For instance,
using a carefully constructed metacognitive training2, Moutier
(2000), Moutier et al. (2002), and Moutier and Houde (2003),
have shown that the diﬃculties of school-age children (but
also adults) to solve a simple deductive reasoning task are not
due to a lack of logic but instead to an inability to inhibit a
perceptual bias triggered by the task instructions. In particular,
they demonstrated that whereas children did not improve their
ability to solve the conditional rule falsiﬁcation task3 when
they were explicitly taught to use a logical truth table (‘logical
component’ training), their performance clearly improved when
logical rules were paired with explicit alerts about the need
to inhibit a perceptual bias (‘logical + inhibitory component’
training), conﬁrming that overriding an automatic response plays
a central role in accessing a more elaborate analysis of the
situation.
The aim of the present study is to investigate whether the
children’s capacity to generate intent-based moral judgment
relies on the need to inhibit their intuitive response to harmful
outcomes. As stressed above, we hypothesized that children
aged 5 to 7/8 years do not produce a “mature” (intent-
based) moral judgment due to diﬃculties in inhibiting their
intuitive/emotional reaction that emerges when faced with a
harmful outcome. In order to test this hypothesis, building
onto a metacognitive training, such as the one described above
(Moutier, 2000; Moutier et al., 2002; Moutier and Houde, 2003),
made to help the participants engage in a reﬂective process
about their decisions. The paradigm we developed aimed at
instructing children to take into account the protagonist’s mental
state (mentalising component), to which we added (or did not
add) executive alarms (inhibitory component). The executive
alarms were designed to warn participants about the tendency
to base our judgment on the automatic reaction toward the
victims’ suﬀering. Importantly, those type of alarms do not aim
to improve children’s general inhibitory control skills but to
increase their ability to strategically deploy inhibitory control
to solve the task. In total, we created three metacognitive
trainings: the mentalising reinforcement (MR) training that
included the mentalising component only, the metacognitive
training with mentalizing and inhibitory reinforcement (MIR)
that included both the mentalising and executive component and
a control reinforcement, without particular reinforcement, used
as a control for any test–retest eﬀect.
2In these studies, the term ‘metacognitive’ was used since the type of training the
children underwent requested them to engage in high order thinking about the task
and engaged the participants in a reﬂective process about the strategy they use to
solve it.
3In the classical, Wason task participants are presented with four cards. Each card
has a letter on one side and a number on the other one. The participants are given
a condition rule (respecting the form “if P, then Q”) – “if there is an ‘A’ on one
side, then there is a ‘4’ on the other side.” The visible cards are ‘A,’ ‘D,’ ‘4’ and ‘7.’
Participants are asked to select all cards that must be turned over in order to verify
if the given condition is true. A vast proportion of participants choose the cards ‘A’
and ‘4,’ which is not the logically correct response, which would be ‘A’ and ‘7’ (i.e.,
P and not-Q).
To investigate the impact of our diﬀerent metacognitive
trainings on 5 to 8-year-old children’s moral abilities, moral
judgments were measured before and after the training, using
an experimental paradigm adapted from Buon et al. (2013b).
We gathered children’s judgments about protagonists involved
in a simple coincidence (a victim suﬀers but the protagonist
does not cause harm and does not have a harmful intention),
an accidental harm (a protagonist causes harm while having
a harmless intention), and an aggression (a protagonist causes
harm while having a harmful intention). The situations were
represented using pairs of non-verbal cartoons, each pair
contrasting protagonists based either on the protagonists’ causal
roles (causal contrast: coincidence versus accident) or the
protagonists’ intentions to harm (intentional contrast: accident
versus aggression). Children were then asked to evaluate
each protagonist individually and, by comparing protagonists
presented in a given pair, we obtained an index of each child’s
moral sensitivity to protagonists’ causal role and protagonists’
intention to harm. In short, all children ﬁrst underwent a (pre-
test) moral task designed to assess their initial moral sensitivity
to protagonists’ causal roles and their intention to harm, and
thus their ability to give more weight to the agent’s’ intentions
in their moral judgment. Then, they were randomly assigned
to one of the three metacognitive training described above
(control, mentalising, or inhibitory reinforcement). Finally, in
order to examine the impact of our diﬀerent metacognitive
trainings on children’s moral judgment, participants passed
a post-test, in which they underwent the same moral task
as in the pre-test. The post-test was identical to the pre-
test in order to be able to attribute any observed eﬀect
solely to the training and avoid any possible confounding
factors4.
Note also that in order to establish the developmental
validity of our paradigm, a group of 16 healthy adults were
administered in the pre-test (average age 26.12, nine women, see
Supplementary Material S01).
The predictions were as follows: ﬁrstly, we expected that
during the pre-test, children’s moral judgments would be
equally sensitive to the protagonist’s causal role and intention
to harm, whereas adults’ moral judgments would be mostly
sensitive to protagonist’s intentions. This would reﬂect the
developmental pattern introduced above, according to which,
even though children start to integrate protagonists’ intentions
from an early age, they are not able, contrary to adults, to
prioritize this information in their moral judgment before
8/9 years of age. Secondly, we expected that only the training
including an executive warning about the need to inhibit a
preponderant emotional response (Metacognitive training with
MIR) will have an eﬀect on children’s moral judgments, allowing
them to generate an intent-based moral judgment. This would
demonstrate that 5 to 8-year-old school-age children’s diﬃculty
to generate intent-basedmoral judgment do not come from a lack
of sensitivity to protagonists’ intentions but from an inability to
inhibit their intuitive reactions to harmful outcomes.
4Any carry over eﬀect of the pre-test was controlled by the control training, where
the participants had equal exposure to the stimuli as in the other group.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
Population
Native French speaking children between the ages of 5 and
8 years were recruited at the science museum in Paris “La cite
des sciences,” accompanied by their parents. A total of 102
children participated, but 30 children were removed from the
analysis (one was below the age range, 29 children unsuccessfully
completed the metacognitive training protocol: CR training,
n = 2; MR training, n = 12, MIR training, n = 15). This
drop rate may appear abnormally high compared to other
metacognitive trainings that have been previously done in the
literature. However, it should be noted that, in contrast to
previous experiments of this kind that repeated the trainings as
many times as necessary (Moutier, 2000; Moutier et al., 2002;
Moutier and Houde, 2003), we decided to repeat the resume
of the metacognitive training only once (see procedure below)
which may justify why we had to remove a substantial number
of children. In total, 72 children successfully completed the
metacognitive training protocol. In each group, there was a total
of 24 children. The mean age of the children was 6.97 (CR group:
6.72 years; MR group: 7.01; MIR group: 7.17 years5). Of the 72
participants, 42 were girls.
Sixteen healthy adults recruited at the Ecole Normale
Supérieure (Paris, France) also completed the pre-test of our
experiment (mean age = 26.12 years). All adults were volunteers
who agreed to participate in the study.
Stimuli
Videos
For the pre- and post-test sessions of the experiment we used
videos that have previously been validated and used in a study by
Buon et al. (2013b), as well as new videos that has been validated
in a pilot study using 16 adult participants (see Supplementary
Material S01 for results of the pilot study). The videos were
constructed in Adobe Flash 8.0. and lasted 10 s, with either Mr.
Blue or Mr. Green as the protagonist, swinging near a road (on
a swing or a rope by the road scenario), or Mr. Gray and Mr.
Yellow, (swinging on a trapezoid or on a bar in a park scenario).
They all had Mr. Red as the victim.
For each protagonist, there were three diﬀerent conditions (see
Figure 2). In the aggression conditions, the protagonist faces the
road, swings just once and stops. Then, he looks at the road as
the victim (Mr. Red) is approaching and starts swinging again
and intentionally hits Mr. Red when he is standing right in front
of him. The aggression condition is therefore characterized by
a negative intention and a negative causal role of the agent. In
the accidental conditions, the protagonist is facing away from the
road. He looks at the road while there is nobody (for the same
duration as in the aggression conditions), and starts swinging.
While the protagonist is swinging, Mr. Red, who is walking by, is
5When children were split into two age groups based on the median age
(younger < 6.9 years-old, older > 6.9 years-old), we observed neither signiﬁcant
eﬀect of age [F(1,70)< 1, p> 0.1] nor age by contrast interaction [F(1,70) = 2.76,
p > 0.1, µ2p = 0.3]. We thus decided to merge 5 to 8-year-olds children
together. There was also no signiﬁcant diﬀerence of age across the three groups
[F(1,71)= 1.08, p> 0.1].
FIGURE 2 | Synopsis of the three conditions used in the pre- and
post-test sessions of the experiment. In the Coincidence scenario, the
protagonist does not hit Mr. Red who falls on his own. In the Accident
scenario, the protagonist hits Mr. Red without knowing that Mr. Red was on
the road. In the Aggression scenario, the protagonist intentionally hits Mr. Red.
accidentally hit by the second swinging action In this condition,
the agent therefore has a neutral intention, since he showed a
sign of not wanting to cause harm, but has, however, a negative
causal role. In the coincidental conditions, the protagonist’s
movements are identical to those displayed in the accidental
conditions except that they are shifted in time (0.5 s), so that
he stops swinging before the victim stumbles by his own doing,
characterizing the condition with a neutral/positive intention and
a neutral causal role of the agent since the negative outcome
cannot be ascribed to the agent’s actions. In sum, the three types
of conditions contained the same actions, with the only diﬀerence
being their relative timing and the orientation of the protagonists
(facing toward vs. away from the road).
Conditions were paired so as to form diﬀerent contrast
measures (diﬀering in only one aspect): the causal contrast –
comparison of the accident and the coincidence scenarios –
yielding a measure of the inﬂuence of the protagonist’s causal
role in moral/social evaluations; or the intentional contrast –
comparing the accident and the aggression scenarios – yielding
a measure of the inﬂuence of intention ascription in moral/social
evaluations.
Training Stimuli
We built three types of metacognitive trainings (Table 1)
to which the children were randomly assigned, aiming at
diﬀerent objectives: (1) a control reinforcement (CR) – without
instructions to focus speciﬁcally on one component of the
situation; (2) a MR – aimed at reinforcing the children’s focus
on mental states; (3) MIR – aimed at warning the children
about the need to inhibit their automatic reaction toward the
victim’s suﬀering, alongside with reinforcing the child’s capacities
to focus on mental states. The three metacognitive trainings all
used the same baseline images, constructed for this experiment,
illustrating two boys playing with a ball (see Figure 3). In the
story, two boys are playing together. One of the boys is throwing
the ball but accidentally trips and the ball lands on the other boy’s
head injuring the other boy. For all three trainings, we ﬁrst started
by presenting the story plot-line to the child. The child was then
asked to judge whether the boy who threw the ball was nice or
mean.
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TABLE 1 | Statements told to the child at the introduction (before the black bar) and the summarize of the training (after the black bar), as a function of
the type of training.
CR MR MIR
(. . .) I suggest we look at all the different elements of the story in order to better understand, how we can give these different responses.
Indeed, there is a trap here, which is to only look at certain elements of the story, for instance to only
look at the blond boy getting hurt at the end of the story. The risk would be to forget other elements of
the story that might help us respond to the question
So, in order to respond to the question it is important
to not to fall in to this trap, that is to say not to look at just one single element of the story and
to look at all of the elements of the story, including what the brown haired boy wanted to do in the beginning of the story
Let’s look at the different responses: if we only look at the blond boy being hurt at the end of the story after the dark haired boy threw the ball, we could have the need
to say that the dark haired boy is mean.
So, if we look at the fact that the dark haired boy did not actually want to hurt the blond boy, we can give a different response to the question of whether the dark haired
boy is mean or nice, and we can say that he is in fact nice.
So, to summarize, when we see someone getting hurt, in order to say if the person who hurt him is nice or mean, we should try and look at all the elements of the
story. So here we need:
First not to fall into the trap and the gray cage helps us do this. We must not look at only the end of the
story when the blond boy gets hurt, otherwise we could automatically respond saying that the dark
haired boy is bad and we risk forgetting other elements from the beginning of the story which are
important and can lead us want to a different response. Second, once we have avoided the trap, we
can look at different elements of the story since it is also important.
To ask ourselves what the dark haired boy actually wanted to do at the beginning of the story, which the yellow circle helps us remember. Since the dark haired
boy tripped and since the ball flew in an unwanted direction, we can say that the dark haired boy simply wanted to play and we can prefer to say that he is nice,
which is the second possible answer to the question.
In CR condition, children listen to the sentences presented in the left column. In the MR condition, the sentences presented in the second column were added. In the
MIR conditions, the sentences presented in the third column were added. For space issues, we excluded from this table all the statements that included the picture. The
training can be find in Supplementary Material.
The instructions for the metacognitive trainings diﬀered with
respect to the three conditions and took place after the story plot
line was presented (see Supplementary Material S02 for detailed
descriptions of the diﬀerent conditions). In the CR training, the
child was told that, when faced with the same question, people
tend to respond diﬀerently and was told which two diﬀerent
responses were possible (e.g., ‘you could say that he’s mean if you
focus on what he did to the other boy’ vs. ‘you could say that he’s
not mean if you focus on what he really wanted to do: throw the
ball for the other boy to catch’). In the MR training, the control
condition script was expanded to a total of eight instructions
that focused on the child’s attention to the signs revealing the
protagonist’s intentions, instructing the child not to forget to
take these indices into account when making their judgment.
Additional material was used during these instructions: a cloud-
callout in order to emphasize the intention of the protagonist,
and a yellow circle to highlight and facilitate the orientation of
the child on the intention indices, which was placed over the
cloud-callout. In the MIR training, the script and procedure for
the MR training was further expanded, with an equal amount
of new instructions (executive alerts; n = 8). These additional
instructions aimed at focusing the child on the necessity to not
only respond automatically to the fact that a boy was hurt, as
this could make him forget to take into account other factors
regarding the story (e.g., the protagonist’s intention). We also
added further support material: a dashed gray cage, which was
placed on the image of the boy getting hurt, in order to help the
child understand that this is not the only element that should
be taken into account when faced with the question. At the end
of each metacognitive training, children were asked questions to
verify that they understood the diﬀerent elements of the story
(see Supplementary Material S02. for a precise description of the
questions asked). Answers were not taken into account for the
ﬁnal analysis but instead only served as a validation criterion for
the training, including or excluding the child from the study.
Procedure
Children were recruited at “La cité des sciences” (Paris, France)
with their parents during weekends. Children were ﬁrst asked if
they wanted to take part to an experiment consisting of watching
some cartoons then answering questions about the. Then, parents
of the children were explained the aims of the study and shown
the video of one of the aggressive agents. If they thought this
cartoon was appropriate to their children (which was the case
for all the parents), they were given, the informed consent form
to sign, and the experiment proceeded. The child took part
in the experiment individually in a quiet room (see Figure 4
for a schematic representation of the procedure followed). The
child was ﬁrst familiarized with the response buttons, with
which they would later respond. This type of responding was
choosen, since we hoped to collect children’s response time that
are known to be highly relevant to measure the deployment of
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FIGURE 3 | Baseline images used during the metacognitive training session to illustrate the story plot-line presented to the child. In the story, two boys
are playing together. One of the boys is throwing the ball but accidentally trips and the ball falls on the other boy’s head injuring the other boy.
FIGURE 4 | Schematic representation of the procedure used with children. In a pre-test session, children were presented with two blocks of videos designed
to assess their sensitivity to the protagonists’ causal roles and to the protagonists’ intentions to harm. Each block contained a pair of videos. In a given block, each
video was first presented, and followed by an individual questionnaire (Ind Q). The two videos were then presented again and followed by a questionnaire asking
children to compare the two protagonists from a moral standpoint (Comp Q). During the metacognitive training, children were randomly assigned to one of the three
conditions [control (CR), mentalising reinforcement (MR), or mentalising and inhibitory reinforcement (MIR)]. Finally, after the session with the metacognitive training,
children underwent a post-training session identical to the pre-training session.
costly cognitive processes. However, we observed a really high
variability across children: whereas some were really at ease with
using the keys on the keyboard to answer, some children were not
and only answered orally the questions that were asked, letting
the experimenter press the buttons. As a result, the response
times could not be a valid measure for subsequent analysis. This
familiarization was followed by a pre-training session during
which the child was presented with two diﬀerent video pair
contrasts (each child therefore saw four videos) across two blocks
(see Figure 4). Each video was presented twice and followed
by individual questions about the protagonists, allowing us to
obtain children’s absolute evaluations of each protagonist (“Is he
a good guy?,” “Is he a bad guy?,” “Do you want to play with
him?,” and “Do you want to give him a gift?”). In order to
answer, the children had to press the button (“yes,” “no,” “I don’t
know” she/he was familiarize with before). Then both videos
forming the contrast were presented again andwere followed by a
series of comparative questions, where the two protagonists were
presented side by side: “Who is the bad guy?,” “Who is the good
guy?,” “Who do you want to play with?,” and “Who do you want
to give a gift to?.” To answer, the child had to press on computer
keys that carry the colors of the characters. The experimenter
asking the questions was blind to the videos presented to the
child. If the child responded with “both” or “neither” on any of
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the comparative questions, the experimenter noted the answer
by pressing a button on the keyboard; and if the child failed
to respond, the experimenter noted the absence of response.
A contrast pair of the Blue/Green protagonists was presented
ﬁrst (block 1) and secondly a contrast pair of the Gray/Yellow
scenario (block 2). The color of the protagonist was partially
counterbalanced (Mr. Blue vs. Mr. Green and Mr. Gray vs. Mr.
Yellow), as well as the relative meanness of the protagonist in the
ﬁrst video of a contrast was counterbalanced (nicer vs. meaner),
and the order of the protagonist’s role in the second contrast pair
in regards to the ﬁrst contrast pair (nicer/meaner – meaner/nicer
vs. meaner/nicer – nicer/meaner).
Following the child’s answer to the last video, a second
experimenter proceeded with the metacognitive training session.
In all three conditions, we presented the images of the story
plot-line one by one to the child. It should be noted that the
hair color of the boy throwing the ball and the boy getting hurt
was counterbalanced. After this presentation, we asked the child
how he/she judged the boy who threw the ball. Subsequently
smaller versions of all four images from the story timeline
were put in front of the child, in chronological order, and we
proceeded with the adequate training script. Once the script
was ﬁnished, we asked the child what the possible answers to
the initial question would be, and how could we justify them.
Once the child could repeat the key elements, justifying the
diﬀerent responses, we considered the training as successful
and continued on to the post-training session. If the child did
not answer correctly, we repeated the resume of the training
once again. Concerned with time limitations as well as biases
that could occur due to an overexposure to the stimuli, we
decided that if the child could not give correct explanations
to the questions after the repetition of the resume, he was
excluded from the analysis but nonetheless went on to ﬁnish the
study.
The post-test session then followed and was identical to the
pre-test presentation of the videos. Therefore any variation in




In order to measure the extent to which children were able
to distinguish the protagonists on the basis of the components
manipulated in our paradigm using contrasts (the protagonist’s
causal role and intention to harm), contrastive indexes were
computed on the responses to the individual and comparative
questionnaire as follows: for coding purposes the aggressive
protagonist was considered the most ‘harmful,’ the coincidental
protagonist the least ‘harmful,’ and the accidental protagonist
intermediate. Responses in favor of the least harmful protagonist
in a given contrast (the coincidental one for the causal contrast,
the accidental one for the intentional contrast) were scored +1.
Responses in the opposite direction were scored –1. A response
“both” or “none” was scored as a zero. For each contrast (causal
vs. intentional), a contrastive index was deﬁned as the average
of the 12 scores obtained for each individual and comparative
questions in a given contrast (causal vs. intentional contrastive
index). Each index ranged between +1 (preference for the less
harmful protagonist) and –1 (preference for the more harmful
protagonist). Note that individual questions allowed us to obtain
participants’ absolute evaluations of each protagonist separately
(i.e., whether a protagonist is evaluated positively or negatively
on an absolute scale). We report all the analysis we conducted
on absolute evaluations of protagonists in the Supplementary
Material S03.
All the analyses were done using IBM SPSS Statistics 20. We
report ﬁrst the developmental eﬀect obtained between children
and adults’ moral judgments and then the metacognitive training
eﬀect.
Developmental Effect
In order to explore the developmental eﬀect between children
and adults on the importance given to protagonists’ causal role
and intentions to harm when generating moral judgment, we ﬁrst
conducted a general linear model (GLM)with contrastive indexes
obtained for each contrast (contrast causal vs. intentional) during
the pre-test as repeated measures, age of participants (adults
vs. children), and counterbalancing factors (order of contrast,
color of protagonists, order of protagonists’ presentation, sex
of participants) as between subjects factors. Results revealed no
eﬀect of contrast [F(1,61) = 1.02, p < 0.1, µ2p = 0.01] nor
of age [F(1,61) < 1, p > 0.1, but did reveal a signiﬁcant age
by contrast interaction F(1,61) = 4.87, p < 0.05, µ2p = 0.07].
GLMs conducted separately for each age group indicated that,
in children, the contrastive index obtained for the causal index
tended to be higher than the one obtained for the intentional
contrast [F(1,56) = 2.92, p < 0.09, µ2p = 0.05] whereas in
adults the contrastive index obtained for the intentional contrast
was higher than the one obtained for the causal contrast
[F(1,5) = 16.41, p = 0.01, µ2p = 0.76]. Therefore, children
tended to preferentially weight the protagonists’ causal role in
their moral judgments while adults preferentially weighted the
protagonists’ intentions in their moral judgment (Figure 5A).
GLMconducted on each contrast separately indicate amain eﬀect
of age for the intentional contrast [F(1,87) = 4,99, p > 0.05,
µ2p = 0.07] but not for the causal one [F(1,87) = 1, 67, p > 0.1,
µ2p = 0.02]. Importantly, those developmental diﬀerences seem
due to cases of accidental harm as children’s absolute evaluations
of agents were comparable to adults’ ones for cases of aggression
and coincidence but were more harsh for both cases of accidental
harms (see Supplementary Material S03).
Despite this developmental diﬀerence regarding the respective
weight given to the protagonists’ causal roles and their intentions
to harm, it should be noted that the intercepts for the contrastive
indexes obtained for the causal and the intentional contrasts
were both signiﬁcant for children (see Table 2 for statistics). It
indicates that children’s moral judgments were able to distinguish
intentional harm from accidental harm as well as accidental
harm from a mere coincidence. In brief, children are both
sensitive to protagonists’ causal roles and intentions to harm. In
adults, the intercept for the intentional contrast was signiﬁcant
and was only marginally signiﬁcant for the causal contrast,
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FIGURE 5 | (A) Mean contrastive index obtained during the pre-test as a
function of the age group (children vs. adults) and the contrast presented
(causal vs. intentional contrast). (B) Mean contrastive index obtained for
children during the post-test session as a function of the contrast presented
and the type of metacognitive condition they previously underwent (control
(CR) vs. mentalising (MR) vs. mentalising and inhibitory (MIR) reinforcements).
TABLE 2 | Significance of the intercept for each contrastive index obtained
for each contrast (causal vs. intentional) and each group of participants
(children vs. adults) during the pre-test, ∗∗∗p > 0.0001, ∼p < 0.1.
Children Adults
Causal contrast F (1,56) = 35.5∗∗∗ F (1,5) = 4.92∼
Intentional contrast F (1,56) = 28.97∗∗∗ F (1,5) = 209.34∗∗∗
indicating that adults integrated the protagonists’ intentions to
harm in their moral judgment while they only had a tendency
to integrate the protagonists’ causal roles. Figure 5A represents
the mean contrastive index for each contrast presented (causal
vs. intentional) and each age group (children vs. adults) during
the pre-test.
Metacognitive Training Effect
Before exploring the eﬀect of our diﬀerent metacognitive
training, we ﬁrst ensured that all groups of children were
comparable on their moral judgment prior to the metacognitive
training by conducting a GLM with the two indexes for each
contrast (causal vs. intentional) obtained during the pre-test as
repeated measures, the metacognitive training type (CR vs. MR
vs. MIR) and all the counterbalanced factors as between subjects
factors. Results showed no main eﬀect of the group [F(2,27)< 1,
p > 0.1] nor contrast by group interaction [F(2,27) = 1.58,
p > 0.1], indicating that children’s moral judgments during the
pre-test were similar across the three types of metacognitive
trainings.
In order to explore the eﬀect of our diﬀerent metacognitive
training types on children’s moral judgments, we conducted a
GLM with the contrastive indexes for the two contrasts ( causal
vs. intentional) and the two times of testing (pre-test vs. post-
test) as repeated measures, the metacognitive training type (CR
vs. MR focus vs. MIR) as well as all the counterbalancing factors
as between subjects factors. Results revealed no main eﬀect of
metacognitive training type [F(2,27) < 1, p > 0.1] but a main
eﬀect of the time of testing [F(1,27)= 4.17, p= 0.051,µ2p = 0.13),
indicating that globally children’s contrastive indexes were higher
after the metacognitive training than before the metacognitive
training (mean contrastive index before the metacognitive
training = 0.28, SE = 0.08, mean contrastive index after the
metacognitive training = 0.38, SE = 0.10). This analysis did not
reveal time of testing by contrast interaction [F(1,27) = 1.67,
p > 0.1, µ2p = 0.01] but revealed a time of testing by contrast
by metacognitive training type interaction [F(2,27) = 3.55,
p< 0.05,µ2p = 0.21]. This three-way interaction suggests that our
diﬀerent metacognitive trainings had distinctive eﬀects on the
way children weight the protagonists’ causal role and intention to
harm before and after the metacognitive training. Therefore, to
better understand the meaning of this interaction, we conducted
for each metacognitive training separately, the same GLM as
before except that the training type factor was removed from
the analysis. Figure 5B represents the mean contrastive index for
each contrast and each metacognitive training type obtained in
children during the post-test session.
The analysis conducted on the CR andMR groups revealed no
main eﬀect of the contrast presented [CR group: F(1,8) = 1.56,
p > 0.1, µ2p = 0.14; MR group: F(1,8) < 1, p > 0.1] nor of the
time of testing [CR group: F(1,8) = 3.09, p> 0.1, µ2p = 0.25; MR
group: F(1,8) = 1.68, p > 0.1, µ2p = 0.17] or contrast by time
of testing interaction [CR group: F(1,8) < 1, p > 0.1; MR group
F(1,8)= 1.70 p> 0.1, µ2p = 0.17]. This indicates that in these two
groups, the metacognitive training procedures did not have any
eﬀect on children’s moral judgments.
By contrast, for children who underwent the MIR training, the
analysis revealed no eﬀect of contrast [F(1,8) = 1.05 p > 0.1,
µ2p = 0.09] nor of time of testing [F(1,8) = 1.09 p > 0.1,
µ2p = 0.09] but a signiﬁcant contrast by time of testing interaction
[F(1,8) = 10.03, p = 0.01, µ2p = 0.50], suggesting thus that the
weight given to the protagonists’ causal roles over protagonists’
intentions did change in children who underwent the MIR
training. In line with this, follow-up analyses revealed that, while
children from this group gave equal weight to the protagonists’
causal role and the protagonists’ intention during the pre-test,
[F(1,10) < 1, p > 0.1], they tended to preferentially weigh the
protagonists’ intentions in their moral judgments during the
post-test (i.e., the contrastive index is higher for the intentional
contrast than for the causal contrast: [F(1,10) = 3.46, p = 0.09,
µ2p = 0.25]. This suggests, in line with the descriptive results,
that the MIR training increases children’s use of information
about intention while decreasing their reliance on information
about the agent’s causal role. However, GLM conducted on each
contrast taken separately with the time of testing as repeated
measures and all of the counterbalanced factors as between
subjects factor revealed a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the time of testing
for the index obtained for the intentional contrast but failed to
reach signiﬁcance for the causal contrast [eﬀect of the time of
testing on the intentional contrast F(1,8) = 7.119, p < 0.05,
µ2p = 0.416; on the causal contrast: F(1,8) = 2.543, p > 0.1,
µ2p = 0.203].
In a ﬁnal analysis, we wanted to check whether the pattern
of judgments generated by children from diﬀerent metacognitive
training groups after the training diﬀered from the adults’ pattern
of judgment before the training. To do that, we compared
children’s post-test evaluations of the diﬀerent contrasts with
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adults’ pre-test evaluations of the very same contrasts. In children,
who underwent the CR and the MR training, we found no
main eﬀect of age [CR: F(1,24) < 1, p > 0.1, MR: F(1,24) < 1,
p > 0.1] or contrast [CR: F(1,24) = 1.27, p > 0.1, µ2p = 0.05;
MR: F(1,24) < 1, p > 0.1] but still found the signiﬁcant age by
contrast interaction [CR: F(1,24) = 6.77, p < 0.05, µ2p = 0.22;
MR: F(1,24) = 6.05, p < 0.05, µ2p = 0.20] indicating that
even after the metacognitive training children who underwent
the control and the MR trainings continued to give diﬀerent
weights to protagonists’ causal role and intention to harm, as
compared to adults. By contrast, in children who underwent the
MIR training, analyses revealed only a main eﬀect of contrast
[F(1,24) = 5.77, p < 0.05, µ2p = 0.19] but no main eﬀect
of age [F(1,24) = 2.60, p < 0.1, µ2p = 0.09] nor age by
contrast interaction [F(1,24) = 2.60, p < 0.1, µ2p = 0.09],
indicating that after the training, children who underwent the
MIR metacognitive training did not weight the protagonists’
causal roles and their intentions to harm signiﬁcantly diﬀerently
as compared to adults.
DISCUSSION
The aim of the present study was to examine the cognitive
processes involved in the development of a child’s capacity
to integrate and prioritize a protagonist’s intention into his
moral judgment. Speciﬁcally, we hypothesized that 5 to 8-
year-old children’s inability to prioritize information about a
protagonist’s intentions in their moral judgment was due to
limitations in their ability to override the intuitive responses
arising from the perception of a protagonist’s causal role in a
victim’s suﬀering, particularly in the case where the protagonist’s
harmful causal role conﬂicts with his/her innocent intentions
in the judged moral situation (i.e., accidental harm). In order
to test this hypothesis, we presented a series of videos and
measured children’s sensitivity to the protagonist’s causal role
and their intention to harm. Afterward, children underwent
a metacognitive training aiming at increasing their focus and
analysis of protagonists’ intentions, either with or without
executive alarms aiming at reinforcing their ability to inhibit their
intuitive reaction caused by the perception of the protagonist’s
causal role. An additional training was included in order to
control for any test–retest eﬀects. Finally, in order to investigate
the eﬀect of our training on the child’s moral judgment, the
child had to re-evaluate the same videos as seen prior to the
metacognitive training.
Our results indicated that before the metacognitive training,
while 5 to 8-year-old children were sensitive to both the
protagonists’ causal roles and harmful intentions in their moral
judgment, they were unable, contrary to adults, to generate
a moral judgment dominated by the protagonist’s intentions.
In addition, when exploring the impact of our metacognitive
trainings, our results revealed that it had a selective eﬀect in
children who underwent a metacognitive training with MIR.
Only with this type of metacognitive training children were able
to change the relative weight given to the protagonist’s causal
roles and intentions, in favor of the protagonist’s intentions.
These results ﬁrst reproduce the developmental pattern of
the ability to generate intent-based moral judgment that we
described in the introduction. We especially conﬁrm that, by the
age of 5, children are sensitive to the protagonist’s intentions,
while still being unable to integrate them as a priority in
their moral judgment (Nelson-Le Gall, 1985; Shultz et al.,
1988; Baird and Astington, 2004; Nobes et al., 2009; Cushman
et al., 2013). Importantly, as demonstrated in the analyses, we
conducted on participants’ absolute evaluations of protagonists
(see Supplementary Material S01), from 5 to 8 years of age,
children ﬁnd it especially diﬃcult to generate lenient judgments
about protagonists committing accidental harm, thus conﬁrming
that the late development of intent-based moral judgment
appears to be mostly due to a diﬃculty to integrate a protagonist’s
innocent intention (Cushman et al., 2013).
Crucially, our study provides important insights into the
processes responsible for this late emergence of mature intent-
basedmoral judgment in regards to harmful situations, indicating
that only children who were instructed to “not focus too much”
on the consequences of the situation were able to show adult-like
judgment after the metacognitive training. This result could not
be taken as a test–retest eﬀect nor as a side eﬀect resulting from an
over-exposure to situations of accidental harm since children who
underwent the control training did not show any modiﬁcation
between the two times of testing. This result could neither be
taken as the result of the MR in the metacognitive trainings
since children who were (only) explicitly instructed to focus their
attention on the intent/mental states did not progress more than
children from the control group. In line with our hypothesis,
it suggests 5 to 8-year-old children’s shortcomings to generate
intent-based moral judgments are not due to their inability to
focus on or to represent and correctly use the protagonist’s mental
states, but their diﬃculty to override the intuitive evaluation
based on the protagonist’s causal role.
Surprisingly, our results indicate that our inhibitory
reinforcement training signiﬁcantly impacts children’s ability to
distinguish intentional harm from accidental harm, but not their
ability to distinguish accidental harm from mere coincidences.
Since our training was designed to increase children’s use of
information about intentions and decrease their reliance on
information about the action’s outcomes, we may have expected
our training to have an opposite eﬀect on the causal and
intentional contrasts. This absence of eﬀect on the evaluation
of the agent’s causal role does not prevent us to claim that the
ability to generate intent-based moral judgment relies on the
ability to override its aﬀective reaction to the perceived accidental
harm. Indeed, our MIR training and the eﬀect we obtained on
the intentional contrast were suﬃcient to induce a shift from
a tendency to favor agents’ causal roles to a tendency to favor
agents’ intentions in children’s moral evaluations. In addition,
as shown in the analyses of children’s absolute evaluations
of agents (Supplementary Material S03), our MIR training
strongly modiﬁes children’s ability to integrate information
about innocent intentions in both the context of the causal and
the intentional contrast. An interesting potential explanation to
the observed ﬁndings could be that the impact of our training
on the evaluation of the agent’s causal role had been hidden by
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children’s more lenient evaluation of coincidence conditions
after the training compared to before, making the diﬀerentiation
between accidental and coincidence similar between the two
times of the testing (for evidence in favor of this hypothesis, see
Supplementary Material S03).
The present ﬁndings are congruent with recent models arising
from cognitive neuroscience according to which an individual’s
ability to make a moral judgment would depend on a dual-
process system of evaluation (Cushman, 2008; Greene, 2009).
Such processes occasionally conﬂict when what would be the
most relevant response arises from a non-automatic processes
and conﬂicts with an intuitive/automatic response that needs
to be overridden, which requires cognitive control resources,
(Greene, 2009). The validity of this type of model has already
been demonstrated in the context of the now famous high conﬂict
moral dilemmas (Greene, 2009), but also in adults’ evaluations
of accidental harm (Young et al., 2007; Buon et al., 2013b, see
also Treadway et al., 2014). The present study is the ﬁrst to
explore experimentally such an architecture in the development
of moral competencies. By showing that executive alerts are
critical to allow school-aged children to generate intent-based
moral judgments, our results suggest that a dual processes model
accounts for the protracted development of morality and that
inhibitory control may be critical to provide mature moral
judgment.
Our results are in line with a recent study that showed
interesting neurodevelopmental changes in structures typically
involved in aﬀective saliency (i.e., amygdala and insula);
responses in these areas decreased with age. Conversely, activity
in regions of the medial and ventral prefrontal cortex, which
are reciprocally connected with the amygdala and thought to be
involved in resolving conﬂict, decision-making and evaluation,
increased with age (Decety et al., 2011). This suggests thus
that processing moral situations is more dependent upon
basic aﬀective responses in younger participants than in older
participants. Finally, our ﬁndings are also in line with Richardson
et al. (2012) who proposed that young children tend to base their
judgments on an experience system, a system that encourages
a focus on the outcome while older children would be more
and more able to use a representational system, thanks to their
growing executive functions that would permit to override the
experience system. Whether the “cause-based heuristic” (that
young children rely on and that the older ones seem to override)
would depend on the child’s personal experience – as proposed
by Richardson and collaborators – with intentional or accidental
harmful actions would deserve further considerations in future
research.
On the contrary, at ﬁrst sight, this result could appear counter-
intuitive given the recent studies which showed that ToM abilities
were highly related to adults (Young et al., 2007; Young and Saxe,
2009; Buon et al., 2013a; Moran, 2013) and children’s abilities
to generate intent-based moral judgment (Baird and Astington,
2004; Killen et al., 2011; Fu et al., 2014). However, as in the ﬁeld
of logical reasoning, demonstrating that inhibition is critical for
solving a certain type of logical problem does not mean that
logical reasoning is unnecessary (Houdé et al., 2000). Instead, it
means that logical abilities are not suﬃcient to solve this type of
problems. Similarly, we think that ToM abilities are necessary but
not suﬃcient to acquire moral maturity: if the participants were
unable to correctly reason about others’ mental states correctly,
we think that our inhibitory-control training would be useless in
helping them to generate intent-based moral judgments.
Related to this issue, it is important to recall that ToM
capacities have been proven to be costly in executive resources
and especially in inhibitory control resources (Carlson et al.,
2004; Apperly et al., 2006). One may thus argue that our
executive alert did not have an impact on the children’s ability
to override the intuitive response arising from the perception
of the protagonist’s causal role, but would permit children (and
adults) to engage in, (or to sustain) the costly ToM reasoning
that would be required to properly interpret the protagonist’s
mental state. According to a ﬁrst scenario, individuals would need
to inhibit their intuitive reactions in order to engage themselves
in ToM reasoning required to detect the protagonist’s intention.
Consequently, inhibition would be required (and thus precede)
to activate any relevant (ToM) reasoning. According to a second
scenario, executive resources would help sustain the inferential
process needed to detect a protagonist’s innocent intentions. For
instance, one may hypothesize that executive resources may be
especially useful in order for individuals to inhibit their own
particularly arousing perspective (“I knew that he was about
to cause harm!”). Both scenarios would predict that without
suﬃcient executive and inhibitory resources, children (or adults)
would be unable to correctly interpret a protagonist who caused
harm. In favor of this hypothesis, an interesting ﬁnding arose
from Killen et al.’s (2011) experiment that showed that children
who passed the classical FBT were slightly worse at inferring a
protagonist’s false–belief whose action caused harm, than that
of a protagonist who did not cause harm in a morally relevant
FBT. However, in a recent study – using the same stimuli
as the ones presented in the current study – adults had to
perform a concurrent verbal shadowing task while evaluating
diﬀerent situations of harm, and the authors controlled so that
the participants under cognitive load conditions were able to
properly represent the protagonists’ intentions (Buon et al.,
2013b). The results revealed that in cognitive load conditions,
whereas adults were above chance at representing the agents’
intentions, they were unable to incorporate them in their moral
judgments. This suggests that the eﬀect of the concurrent task
especially impacts the integration of information about intentions
into the moral judgment and not their detection6. Further studies
are required to disentangle these diﬀerent hypothesis that are
critical to understand the interactions between ToM capacities
and inhibitory control resources in the development of moral
judgment.
Even though the present study provides promising evidence
for a dual model in the ability to generate intent-based moral
judgment — and more speciﬁcally for the importance of
6We did not insert questions about the protagonists’ intentions on purpose,
considering that such information would be uninterpretable since participants may
base their intentionality rating on their moral ratings as a post hoc justiﬁcation, In
addition, we did not want to insert such a training in our design since it could
over-focus children on the protagonist’ intentions, biasing the potential impact of
our diﬀerent metacognitive trainings.
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inhibitory processes in such a moral development — there are
some limitations that should be addressed in order to validate
more comprehensively our conclusions. Firstly our training
paradigm only allowed us to measure the eﬀect of trainings in a
short timeframe: immediately after the trainings took place. This
informs us only on the short term changes in children’s moral
evaluation. However, it must be noted that this study was not
conducted to observe long term learning in the moral domain,
but rather to provide explanations for the late developmental
shift from outcome based to intent based moral judgment.
Secondly, our training paradigm was task speciﬁc since both the
training and the test situations were about cases of accidental
harm and therefore isomorphic tasks, which prevents us to test
for a far transfer eﬀect that our paradigm might produce on
children’s evaluations. Importantly, the type of metacognitive
training with inhibitory components that we used does not aim
to increase children’s general inhibitory eﬃciency. Instead, the
inclusion of emotional alerts (inhibitory component) together
with instructions about the procedure to follow (mentalising
component) aim to increase children’ strategic deployment of
inhibition during the processing of moral situations, allowing
them to override a particular response bias and activate a deeper
reasoning about the presented situation. Using the same type of
inhibitory training as ours in the ﬁeld of logical reasoning, Houdé
et al. (2000) compared individual participants performance on
the post-test to their pre-test performance and showed an
increase of activity within areas that have been typically involved
in both inhibition (i.e., left-middle-frontal gyrus) and logical
thinking (i.e., regions involved in inner speech, such as Broca’s
area). Within the moral domain, Greene et al. (2004) showed
an increased activity in areas that are typically involved in
both inhibitory control and abstract reasoning in adults who
were able to respond ‘rationally’ to the footbridge dilemma
(compared to adults who were not). The evidence described
above suggests that the inhibitory training we used may be
eﬃcient in both allowing the children to inhibit their intuitive
causal evaluations, as well as activating deeper reasoning about
the relevant factors involved in their decision. However, this
suggestion raises the question of whether our training triggers a
deeper reasoning about the agents’ mental states (ToM reasoning,
see also discussion above) or a more generally increase in
children’s ability to reason about non-intuitive components of
the perceived situation. To answer this question, it would be
highly relevant to investigate the generalization of our results
by exploring whether a metacognitive training has an impact on
children’s abilities to generate ‘rational’ responses in others types
of moral dilemma that required to override a prepotent response,
but in which ToM reasoning is critical or not.
Finally, another question that remains to answer in order to
certify the critical role of inhibition in the developmental shift
from outcome based to intent based moral judgment is whether
a pure inhibitory training (e.g., a training involving inhibition
of a non-moral or even non-social intuitive response without
metacognitive components, see for instance Thorell et al., 2009;
Diamond and Lee, 2011; Linzarini et al., 2015) would be eﬃcient
at enabling children to generate intent-based moral judgment.
Since inter-tasks priming paradigms of this kind typically allow
to investigate the degree of generalizability of inhibitory control
(Linzarini et al., 2015), they would not only strengthen the
validity of our conclusions but would also help us to deeply
characterize the kind of inhibition (domain speciﬁc or general
inhibition) that are involved in the processing of the ability to
generate intent-based moral judgment.
CONCLUSION
By showing that a metacognitive training that includes an
inhibitory component induces an important shift in children’s
moral abilities, our experiment suggests an important role of
inhibitory control in the ability to generate intent-based moral
judgment in school-age children. Our results extend ﬁndings
indicated by Moutier (2000), which have shown that only a
training procedure reinforcing the child’s capacity to inhibit
an intuitive response bias would allow the child to give a
logical answer. More broadly, our research clearly ﬁts the
hypothesis which posits that children are “ineﬃcient inhibitors”
(Houdé, 2000). This hypothesis has proven already to justify
several “incompetence” of children, including logical reasoning
(Moutier, 2000; Moutier and Houde, 2003) but also logico-
mathematical reasoning (Houdé, 2000; Poirel et al., 2012; Borst
et al., 2013) and logical categorization (Borst et al., 2012). Our
ﬁndings suggest that children would also be ineﬃcient inhibitors
in the ﬁeld of moral cognition. Beyond allowing us to shed a
new light on an important theoretical challenge that represents
the understanding of the cognitive architecture underlying moral
development, our paradigm may also have an important long-
term impact on the treatment of children with behavioral
problems. Indeed, the use of others’ intentions in everyday
social life interactions is critical for children’s harmonious social
relationships (Arsenio et al., 2009). Notably, it has been shown
that children who were more prone than their peers to the hostile
attribution bias (i.e., the tendency to interpret all provocations
as it seems guided by malevolent intentions) presented a high
rate of reactive aggression (Orobio de Castro et al., 2002; Dodge
et al., 2013). The understanding of the processes underlying this
atypical information processing is crucial to improve the social
life of these individuals by developing targeted new rehabilitation
therapies.
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